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THE LAW OF ICY SIDEWALKS IN
NEW YORK STATE.
The tendency in modern times of the inhabitants of our
country to congregate in our great cities has enormously in-
creased the population of our different municipalities, and this,
in conjunction with the severe and changeable winter weather
in the State of New York, and the consequent slippery and
snowy condition of our sidewalks during several months of each
year, has given rise te almost numberless litigations against our
cities for injuries caused by falling on ice-coated and snow-
covered sidewalks, and the law bearing upon this subject from a
state of uncertainty has become fixed and certain.
It has been the common belief among the laity, that any per-
son falling on an icy or snowy sidewalk, irrespective of its con-
dition as to repair, or how long the snow and ice have remained
on the sidewalk, can recover from the city in whose limits is
situated the sidewalk on which he has fallen. It has been very
commonly believed that our cities are sort of accident insurance
companies to protect everyone against injuries occasioned by
such accidents. The decisions of our courts have, however,
very properly held otherwise, and it is the purpose of this article
to recite briefly the present condition of the law of the Empire
State bearing on this interesting question; a question which
may become of importance to some of my readers.
Primarily it is the duty of every municipality to keep its
streets, which includes the sidewalks, in a safe condition, suita-
ble for the public use, and the city must exercise active vigi-
lance in seeing that its streets are thus kept in the proper condi-
tion.
One of the earliest cases in our Court of Appeals on this
question is that of Todd v. the City of Troy, reported in 61 N.
Y. at page 5o6. Judge Earl in his opinion says: "It was the
duty of the city under its charter to keep the streets in repair
and in suitable condition for public travel, and any person
suffering damage or injury, without any fault on his part, from
a neglect of this duty, has a cause of action against the city."
However, before any municipality can be held liable it must be
THE LAW OF ICY SIDEWALKS.
shown that it had notice of the bad condition of the walk. This
notice may be either actual or constructive. By actual notice is
meant that some officer of the city had received notice of the
condition of the walk. Judge Earl in his opinion in the case
above referred to, says: "By constructive notice is meant such
notice as the law imputes from the circumstances of the case.
* * * They [the municipal authorities] cannot fold their arms
and shut their eyes, and say they have no notice. After a street
has been out of repair so that the defect has become known and
-notorious to those traveling the street, and there has been every
opportunity for the municipality, through its agents charged
with that duty, to learn of its existence and repair it, the law
imputes to it notice and charges it with negligence."
One case, however, has held that notice to a policeman is not
necessarily notice to the city because he was not deemed a
proper officer of the municipality to acquire such notice. An-
other case, however, that of Twogood v. the Mayor, etc., of
New York, 102 N. Y. 216, holds that in an action for negli-
gence in not causing an accumulation of ice to be removed from
a sidewalk, the fact that a patrolman, who was on duty, had
reported to the Instector each day for several days prior to the
injury complained of, that the snow and ice had not been
removed from the sidewalk in question, and where it was the
custom for these reports to be forwarded to police headquarters
and from there to the office of the corporation counsel, was
sufficient to charge the city with notice.
Although the city is required to use active diligence in keep-
ing its sidewalks in proper repair so far as actual defects in their
construction are concerned, it is incumbent upon it to exercise
only what the law terms reasonable diligence to remove from its
sidewalks ice which has formed during the existence of cold
weather from natural causes.
In the case of Kaveney v. the City of Troy, reported in io8
N. Y., page 57I, the Court said: The city is not bound to the
exercise of unreasonable, persistent and extraordinary diligence
during freezing weather to remove ice formed from natural
causes; it is simply bound to keep sidewalks reasonably clean
and safe."
In Corbett v. the City of Troy, 53 Hun. 228, the evidence
shows that a city hydrant was so constructed that water escaped
therefrom and ran across the street, freezing upon the sidewalk
and forming a layer of ice. Some snow fell the day before the
accident, completely covering the formation of ice. The plain-
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tiff in this action could not see the ice because of the recent fall
of snow. There was testimony tending to show that the ice had
existed for some weeks prior to the accident, but this was dis-
puted; but since the hydrant was shown to have been leaking,
although the accumulation of ice may not have existed for a
sufficient length of time to prove constructive notice to the city,
the jury would have been justified in finding negligence on the
part of the city in allowing the water to escape from the hydrant.
The Court says in this case that it was not one where the ice
was formed from what is known as natural causes, such as the
freezing of rain or sleet, and the formation of the ice being the
natural result of the escape of the water, the city might justly
be found guilty of negligence.
The neglect of municipal duty must be very clear in order to
hold the city liable for injuries caused by snow and ice. 1  A
city is not liable in damages for any injuries which are the
results of the slippery condition of a sidewalk produced solely by
ice which is of recent formation.2
It is, however, liable to any one using the sidewalk for
injuries occasioned by an accumulation of ice which has been of
long duration, provided no recent change in the temperature
has caused the formation of a new coating of ice over the old
accumulation, and which may have been the direct cause of the
injury. Something more must always exist than the slippery
condition of the sidewalk to allow a person to recover from a
municipality.
The practitioner in New York State is oftentimes taken by
surprise in the trial of an action for damages resulting from a
fall on a slippery sidewalk. He brings an action on the state-
ment of his client, and perhaps after careful examination of
other witnesses, by whom he is assured that the accumulation of
ice and snow has been of long duration, but on the trial he is
met by the testimony of the Chief of the Weather Bureau, who
with his records is able to give proof which cannot be rebutted,
that during the day on which the accident happened the tem-
perature has risen and fallen to such an extent that an entirely
new coating of ice must have been formed during the very day
of the accident. In such a case the courts say that there are
two causes contributing to the accident; one the accumulation
of ice and snow, which has been of sufficient duration to charge
the municipality with constructive, if not actual notice, and
I Pomfrey v'. Saratoga Springs, 104 N. Y. page 459.
2 Kinney v. the City of Troy, io8 N. Y. 567.
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render the city liable for damages; the other, the recent coating
of ice, for which the city is not liable, and in such a case the
jury cannot be allowed to speculate as to which of the two condi-
tions was the approximate cause of the injuries, and so the
plaintiff should be non-suited.
8
In the case above referred to, for two years prior to the acci-
dent there had been a bank of earth adjoining the sidewalk, and
the rain and frost had forced upon the sidewalk sand, gravel and
stone until the flagging was entirely covered, the deposit sloping
about one inch to the foot from the outer edge of the walk to
the curb. Snow and ice had also for a long time accumulated
upon this slope. The night before the plaintiff fell Lhere was a
rainfall, the rain freezing as it fell, forming a new coating of
ice, and rendering all of the streets in the city slippery and
travel dangerous. It was held that in the absence of evidence
showing that the slope of the walk, or the old snow and ice, was
a concurrent cause without which the accident would not have
happened, the plaintiff could not recover and that it was an error
to submit the question to the jury to speculate upon, and that
there was nothing in the case pointing to the slope as a concur-
rent cause, beyond the bare fact that it existed, and so nothing
to redeem the inference from the domain of mere guess and
speculation.
The court also held that the rule is well settled in New York
"that the defect, even when a concurrent cause, must be such
that without its 'operation the accident would not have hap-
pened" ; that where there is any other cause for which no one is
responsible, "the plaintiff must fail if his evidence does not show
that the damage is produced by the former cause," and that
"he must fail also, if it is just as probable that the injury came
from one cause as the other, because he is bound to make out his
case by a preponderance of evidence and the jury must not be
left to a mere conjecture or to act upon bare possibility. In
this case that rule is violated. The plaintiff slipped upon the
ice. That by itself was a sufficient, certain and operating cause
of the fall. No other explanation is needed to account for what
happened. It is possible that the slope of the walk had some-
thing to do with it. It is equally possible that it did not. There
is not a particle of proof that it did. To affirm it is a pure guess
and an absolute speculation. Are we to send it to the jury for
them to imagine how it might have happened? The great bal-
ance of probability is that the ice was the efficient cause. There
8 Taylor v'. the City of Yonkers, 1o5 N. Y., 202.
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is no probability not wholly speculatfve that the slope was also
such. * * * No knowledge or intelligence can determine or
ascertain that the slope had any part or share in the injury, and
to send the question to the jury is simply to let them guess at it,
and then upon that guess to sustain a verdict for damages."
The court said in this same case that it was willing to hold
cities and villages to a reasonable performance of their duty, but
was not willing to make them insurers by founding their lia-
bility upon mere possibilities.
The question of contributory negligence frequently arises in
this class of negligence cases. The fact, however, that an
embankment of snow and ice is visible to the plaintiff and that
he does not see fit to walk elsewhere than on the sidewalk, is not
of itself such negligence on the part of the plaintiff that he
could not recover.
In the case of Pomfrey v. the Village of Saratoga Springs,
104 N. Y. 459, the defendant requested the court to charge thejury, "That if the obstruction was visible and apparent to any
passerby, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in attempting to
cross it," and also that "if the defect complained of was such as
would be seen by any ordinary person passing along the street,
it was negligence for the plaintiff to attempt to pass over the
defect, but she should have gone around the same." This the
court refused to do and the Court of Appeals held that it would
not have been proper for the court to have charged as a matter
of law that it was negligence for the plaintiff, in the circum-
stances, to endeavor to pass over the embankment, and a refusal
to so charge was not error.
So it is not negligence for a person to walk upon an icy side-
walk without rubbers. As no one is bound to anticipate that
the sidewalks are in a dangerous condition, those using them
have the right to assume that they are in proper and safe con-
dition, and also the right to use them in the usual manner.
It is noteworthy that the Pennsylvania courts hold a much
stricter doctrine on this point, and deem it the duty of a person
approaching a sidewalk which he sees to be icy, to go out into
the street, or even around the block, to avoid it.
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